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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3254  
 ___________ 
 
 ROY ALLEN GREEN, 




WARDEN BLEDSOE; ASSOCIATE WARDEN HUDSON; ASSOCIATE WARDEN 
MAJORANA; CAPTAIN TRATE; LT. HEPNER; LT. SCAMPONI; LT. EDINLER; 




 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-00481) 
 District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2013 
 
 Before:   SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 








 Roy Allen Green appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss/motion for 
2 
 
summary judgment in Green’s civil rights action.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 In March 2011, Green filed a complaint concerning his treatment when at the United 
States Penitentiary, Lewisburg.  After an incident in late October 2009 when alleged members 
of the Aryan Brotherhood assaulted correctional officers, Green (a suspected member of the 
Aryan Brotherhood) and certain other inmates were subjected to “double-cuffing” whenever 
they were moved.  Green, who describes himself as a “large individual,” alleged that the cuffs 
used at Lewisburg were too small for his wrists and had to be forced on, resulting in cuts, open 
wounds, numbness, pins and needles, loss of dexterity, and permanent nerve damage.  Green 
alleged that “big boy” cuffs were available but the defendants refused to use them, despite his 
complaints.  Green stated that he was moved within the prison four times a day and that the use 
of the too-small cuffs for a full calendar year constituted “torture.”  After a year, prison 
officials compromised and allowed Green to be cuffed in one small pair of handcuffs and one 
larger pair, which Green found “not as bad,” although he alleged that it still caused “pain, 
swelling, numbness, [and] occasional bruising.”1
 The assigned Magistrate Judge construed the complaint as raising claims that the tight 
cuffing violated the Eighth Amendment, both through deliberate indifference to Green’s 
medical needs, and through use of excessive force.  The Magistrate Judge recommended 
 
                                                 
1 Green apparently had been moved to a new facility by the time he filed his complaint.  It is not clear 




granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.2
 The Magistrate Judge determined that the supervisory prison officials were not liable for 
excessive force based on their decision to order special restraints, as “Green’s past conduct and 
history amply justified this use of force; the force applied was modest, given the grave dangers 
inherent in Green’s penchant for assaultive conduct; the risk to staff and others posed by Green 
was great . . .; and Green’s ability to nearly kill another prisoner while held under these 
restraints
  As to the medical claim, the 
Magistrate Judge noted that Green had “received on-going medical treatment for his wrist 
injuries,” including “examinations, treatment with ointment and bandages, use of warm 
compresses, and consultation and examination by outside medical experts.”  The Magistrate 
Judge also noted that “medical staff [had] determined that removal of the double handcuffs was 
not medically necessary.”  Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at 33.  The Magistrate Judge 
characterized the claims as mere disagreement as to the proper course of treatment.  The 
Magistrate Judge further determined, citing Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010), that one 
defendant, DeLeon, was a Lieutenant Commander in the Public Health Service, and was thus 
immune from liability. 
3
                                                 
2 Defendants had filed a document characterized as a “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment.”  The Magistrate Judge determined that the motion gave Green notice that it 
might be considered as a motion for summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge noted that Green also 
submitted numerous documents in connection with his response to the Defendants’ motion, so he 
would not be prejudiced if the Court construed the motion as one for summary judgment.   
 demonstrated that it would have been extremely dangerous to further temper these 
security measures.”  R&R at 37-38.  The Magistrate Judge also remarked that Green could not 
 
3 In fact, as the District Court recognized in its Memorandum accompanying the order adopting the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report, Green was not restrained at the time of the referenced incident; he had been 
released from the cuffs for recreation. 
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“premise a constitutional claim on the failure of prison supervisors to act favorably upon his 
complaints,” because “inmates like Green have no constitutional right to a grievance procedure 
in prison.”  R&R at 38 & 39.  The Magistrate Judge further concluded that correctional officers 
were entitled to qualified immunity because their use of force was “objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances.”  R&R at 40-41.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation over Green’s objections, and Green timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  To the extent the District Court 
determined whether evidence supporting a summary judgment motion (or a motion in 
opposition thereto) was competent, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion.  
Schubert v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 148 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1998).  After reviewing 
the underlying evidentiary decisions, we review the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment de novo, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  
Id.; Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011).  A grant of summary 
judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
 Green first argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly considered a videotape 
submitted by the Defendants, which apparently4
                                                 
4 Green was not apprised of the contents of the video; it was submitted for in camera inspection by the 
Magistrate Judge. 
 recorded an incident in May 2010 during 
which Green repeatedly stabbed another inmate.  Green argued that the videotape was 




policy had been in place for several months before the incident.  While this is true, the video 
confirmed the need to continue double-cuffing when transporting Green, and thus was relevant 
in determining whether the prison’s security measures constituted excessive force.  
 Green also argues that the District Court erred by rejecting as hearsay the declarations 
of fellow prisoners that he submitted in support of his response to the summary judgment 
motion.  However, it appears that the Magistrate Judge and District Court Judge considered all 
the evidence that Green submitted.5
 The “‘core judicial inquiry’” in cases involving excessive force is “not whether a certain 
quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’”  Wilkins v. 
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 
(1992)).  “In determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment, courts look to several factors including:  (1) the need for the 
application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was 
used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and 
inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to 
them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”  Brooks v. Kyler, 
  R&R at 40; Dist. Ct. Op. at 3, n.2.  Having determined 
that the District Court properly considered the videotape, and having determined that the 
District Court considered the declarations of Green’s fellow prisoners, we now consider 
whether summary judgment was warranted as to Green’s claims. 





204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (internal 
quotations omitted)).   
 While Green disputes the prison’s purported reasons for instituting double-cuffing,5
Although it is not clear whether Green suffered any permanent injury from the double-cuffing, 
he indisputably suffered minor, temporary injuries.  Although the District Court did not 
explicitly discuss the two remaining factors relating to the amount of force used, given Green’s 
propensity for violence, we cannot say that the amount of force used was grossly 
disproportionate to the need for the use of force.  Green argues that “big boy” cuffs could have 
been used to temper the severity of the force.  While this factor may weigh in his favor, 
considering the totality of the Whitley factors, we hold that the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment on the excessive force claims.   
 he 
concedes that double-cuffing was permissible.  Green also does not directly dispute the finding 
that he posed a threat to the safety of inmates and prison staff.   
  As to the claim that certain of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Green’s 
medical needs, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment was appropriate.  Even 
assuming, without deciding, that Green demonstrated a “serious” medical need, Green cannot 
show that the medical defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need, as we agree with the 
District Court that the “abrasions and contusions suffered by [Green] on his wrists have been 
                                                 
5 Green disputes the prison’s contention that he is a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, and he disputes 
the factual basis for the Magistrate Judge’s statement that Green “repeatedly stockpiled weapons, stole 





routinely and conscientiously treated by prison’s medical staff.”6
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court judgment. 
  Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Thus, we need not reach Green’s allegation that the District Court improperly found that defendant 
DeLeon was immune from Bivens liability because the allegation of the DeLeon’s employment in the 
Public Health Service was supported only by an unverified assertion.   
